Is There A Dead Spot? New Evidence On FOMC Votes Before Elections by Rebecca Hellerstein
Is There a Dead Spot? New Evidence on
FOMC Votes Before Elections
Rebecca Hellerstein1
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
October 2003
1Address: International Research Function, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 33 Liberty
Street, New York, NY 10045-0001; email: rebecca.hellerstein@ny.frb.org.Abstract
Do political pressures aﬀect the conduct of monetary policy? Little is known about how
independent central banks like the Federal Reserve negotiate the political pressures that
are inevitably brought to bear on monetary policymakers. The incumbent president of the
United States has clear incentives to try to inﬂuence monetary policy before each presidential
election. But how presidential politics aﬀects the conduct of the Fed’s policymaking body,
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) remains an open question. Using new data
that chronicle the Fed’s internal forecasts from 1973 through 1994, this paper tests for an
electoral cycle in the voting behavior of FOMC members. The paper provides evidence of a
dead spot in the voting behavior of FOMC members before presidential elections. For given
values of their internal forecasts, FOMC members are less likely to vote to tighten monetary
policy in the year preceding a presidential election than in other periods.
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￿ Tightening doesn￿ t a⁄ect our credibility the same way that easing might. We￿ ve
usually been accused of doing things to help the incumbent, I believe.￿
Robert McTeer, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, October 19921
Do political pressures a⁄ect the conduct of monetary policy? Little is known about how
independent central banks like the Federal Reserve negotiate the political pressures that
are inevitably brought to bear on monetary policymakers. The incumbent president of the
United States has clear incentives to try to in￿ uence monetary policy before each presidential
election.2 But how presidential politics a⁄ects the conduct of the Fed￿ s policymaking body,
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), remains an open empirical question. Using
new data that chronicle the Fed￿ s internal forecasts from 1973 through 1994, this paper tests
for an electoral cycle in the voting behavior of FOMC members. The paper provides evidence
of a dead spot in the voting behavior of FOMC members before presidential elections. A
dead spot is de￿ned as an act of omission, a lack of action where one would normally expect
some. For given values of their internal forecasts, FOMC members are less likely to vote to
tighten monetary policy in the year preceding a presidential election than in other periods.
These results build on theoretical work by Drazen (2001) and on empirical work by Beck
(1987) both of whom hypothesized that the Fed has accommodated an active electoral cycle
1FOMC Transcript, October 6, 1992.
2There is clear evidence that the performance of pre-electoral macroeconomic aggregates helps predict
whether voters will re-elect an incumbent. Fair (1978) ￿nds that a 1-percent rise in real GDP in the year
preceding a U.S. Presidential election (and, in particular, in the second and third quarter of the election
year) corresponds to a 1-percent rise in the incumbent party￿ s vote total. Similar ￿ndings exist for many
OECD countries (Lewis-Beck 1988).
1in ￿scal policy. This paper adds to that literature by providing evidence of a passive electoral
cycle in the instruments of U.S. monetary policy, that is, in FOMC votes.3
It is generally accepted that the Fed acted to assist the incumbent￿ s re-election e⁄ort in the
1972 presidential election.4 There is less agreement on whether or not the Fed has responded
to political pressures in the post-1972 period. One school of thought in the literature, the
￿ independents,￿argues that the Fed has acted more or less independently of political pressure
from the president or from congress in the post-1972 period. Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen
(1997) argue for example, that there is very little evidence of an opportunistic electoral
cycle in monetary policy￿ s intermediate targets in the post-1972 era.5 A second school of
thought, the ￿ accommodators,￿ argues that the Fed has responded to political pressure
from the president or from congress by passively accommodating an active electoral cycle
in ￿scal policy. This position is articulated in Drazen￿ s (2001) review of the literature,
which highlights evidence that the Fed helped create an observed electoral cycle in monetary
3This passivity has two aspects. First, the Fed reacts passively by accommodating, that is, by not acting
to counter an electoral cycle in ￿scal policy created by elected o¢ cials. Second, the Fed reacts passively
in the manner in which it accommodates the ￿scal authorities: It is less likely to tighten, to act, than it
otherwise would be, rather than being as likely to loosen, to act, as it otherwise would be. The literature
that tests for electoral cycles in ￿scal and monetary policy is known as the political-business-cycle (PBC)
literature. See Drazen (2001) for a review. The theory of political business cycles, originally formulated
by William Nordhaus (1975), posits a policymaker who manipulates monetary policy before an election
to ensure the re-election of the incumbent. The economy is stimulated preceding the election: a surge in
in￿ ation follows the election. A substantial literature on political business cycles developed in the late 1970s
and 1980s following Nordhaus￿ s seminal article, most notably the rational partisan model of Alesina (1988)
and various models of ￿scal policy (e.g., Rogo⁄ (1990) and Rogo⁄ and Sibert (1988)).
4See Rogo⁄ (1990) and Drazen (2001).
5Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) test for an electoral cycle in monetary policy before elections by
constructing a dummy variable for the quarters preceding a Presidential election and regressing the growth
rates of various monetary aggregates or the level of interest rates on it alone. Using data from 1947 to 1994,
they ￿nd some evidence of expansionary monetary policy before U.S. Presidential elections in the pre-1972
period but no evidence in the post-1972 period. They run similar regressions with output and unemployment
as the dependent variable and get coe¢ cients that are correctly signed to con￿rm an opportunistic political
business cycle in the post-1972 era but insigni￿cant. Their approach does not control for other things
happening in the economy, so an electoral cycle in even the intermediate targets of monetary policy (monetary
aggregates or interest rates) is di¢ cult to identify.
2aggregates in the 1970s and 1980s by passively accommodating an active electoral cycle in
￿scal policy.6
Empirical evidence to support the accommodators￿position comes from Beck (1987),
who ￿nds that ￿ While there is a cycle in the money supply, there is no cycle in monetary
instruments. The monetary cycle disappears when ￿scal policy is held constant. It appears
as though the Fed passively accommodates ￿scally induced political monetary cycles, but
does not actively cause such cycles.￿ 7 Drawing on this evidence, Drazen (2001) proposes a
political-business-cycle model in which the interaction between a ￿scal and monetary au-
thority causes an electoral cycle in monetary aggregates: The monetary authority passively
accommodates an electoral cycle in ￿scal policy. Drazen calls this model the ￿ active-￿scal-
passive-monetary￿(AFPM) political-business-cycle model.
6The empirical PBC literature distinguishes between tests for electoral cycles in the outcomes and in
the instruments of policy. A large literature has tested for electoral cycles in macroeconomic aggregate
outcomes and has found evidence supporting the Nordhaus model in many countries. Alesina et al (1997)
￿nd post-electoral increases in in￿ ation for a number of OECD countries in the post-war period. Tests of
the Nordhaus model in the United States produce more mixed results. See Alesina et al (1997) and Drazen
(2000). The evidence on macroeconomic outcomes shows a partisan e⁄ect in real GDP growth, but as my
sample contains an equal number of republican and democratic administrations, this is unlikely to bias my
results. That is, from 1949 through 1996, GDP growth has almost invariably been higher in the second
and third year of a democratic administration than of a republican administration (with the exception of
Reagan￿ s second term). The evidence on other macroeconomic outcomes, most notably, the variation in
in￿ ation across democratic or republican administrations, does not support the predictions of the partisan
e⁄ects model. In my data, the partisan a¢ liation of the administrations considered is split equally between
democrats and republicans with one ambiguous case, a republican administration whose macroeconomic
outcomes look much like those of a democratic administration, that is, the second term of Ronald Reagan
from 1984 through 1988. Hence, partisan e⁄ects in macroeconomic outcomes should be quite weak in the
sample as a whole, and are unlikely to a⁄ect the central result.
7Beck (1987), p. 194. Other tests for electoral cycles in the instruments of U.S. ￿scal and monetary policy
give mixed results. Several papers ￿nd evidence of an electoral cycle in U.S. monetary aggregates. Grier
(1989) and Williams (1990) ￿nd that growth in U.S. monetary aggregates follows an electoral cycle through
the mid-1980s. For ￿scal policy, Alesina et al (1997) provide evidence that federal transfers to individuals
(net of contributions to social insurance) exhibit an electoral cycle in the 1960-to-1994 period. The literature
￿nds no evidence of partisan e⁄ects in monetary or ￿scal policy instruments over the time period of my
sample. Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) ￿nd no evidence of partisan electoral e⁄ects in money growth
or in ￿scal policy in the 1961-1994 period. Faust and Irons (1999) and She⁄rin (1989) also ￿nd little or no
support for partisan e⁄ects operating through U.S. monetary policy in the post-WWII period.
3This paper tests Drazen￿ s AFPM model using the Fed￿ s internal forecasts as a benchmark
for monetary policy. That is, the Fed should respond to its own internal forecasts in the
same way before an election as at other times. And because the Fed￿ s forecasts incorporate
a sophisticated forecast of the future path of ￿scal policy, as well as information about other
macroeconomic variables, they give us a unique control for other things happening in the
economy that is missing from previous studies. Finally, using FOMC members￿votes allows a
more direct test for an electoral cycle in monetary instruments than previous tests on those
instruments￿intermediate targets such as monetary aggregates or interest rates. FOMC
votes represent the most direct measure of the intentions of monetary policymakers. By
contrast, the monetary aggregates and interest rates used by Beck (1987), Alesina, Roubini,
and Cohen (1997), and others can be a⁄ected by factors other than Fed intentions such as
shifts in bond-market expectations or changes in banking regulations.
I focus on the post-1972 period to address the most interesting unanswered question in
the literature: to what extent has the Fed responded to political pressure in the post-1972
era? I ￿nd evidence to support the accommodators￿position in the full sample and in the
post-1972 period: for a given set of values of their internal forecasts, the FOMC appears
less likely to vote to tighten monetary policy in the period preceding a presidential election
than at other times. These results hold both for individual committee members￿votes and
for votes of the committee as a whole.
42 A Simple Model of FOMC Voting Behavior
A simple economic model of the voting behavior of FOMC members serves as a basis for
a probit estimation. Suppose we observe t=1,...,T committee votes. FOMC committee
member i maximizes a social welfare function W by choosing an optimal monetary policy
!i at vote t given the current forecasted values of in￿ ation and real output growth:
max
!it
W (xt;￿t;zt;"it) = xt￿ + ￿￿t + ￿zt + "it (1)
where xt and ￿t represent the forecast for real output growth and in￿ ation at committee
vote t, respectively, zt represents a political externality that a⁄ects the social-welfare calcu-
lation in the period preceding a presidential election, and "it captures idiosyncratic factors
that may a⁄ect the social-welfare calculation but that are not included in the other variables.
Transcripts of FOMC meetings reveal that the committee almost never considers a vote
to tighten and a vote to loosen at the same meeting. The committee invariably limits itself
to a binary choice: either to tighten or leave policy unchanged or to loosen or leave policy
unchanged. This narrative evidence motivates estimation of the model￿ s coe¢ cients in two
separate procedures: one to obtain coe¢ cients for the determinants of votes to tighten and
a second to obtain coe¢ cients for votes to loosen.
I model the vote of member i on committee vote t as a discrete dependent variable yit
with Prob(yit = 1jxt;￿t;zt;"it) = F(xt￿ +￿￿t +￿zt +"it) . There are two alternative policy
responses in each of two voting regimes: to tighten policy or to leave policy unchanged in
the ￿rst regime, and to loosen policy or to leave policy unchanged in the second regime.
5Coe¢ cients in the model represent changes in the probability of a vote to tighten (or loosen)
relative to a vote not to change for given values of the independent variables. To test for
political-business-cycle e⁄ects in the committee￿ s voting behavior, I identify zt as an election
dummy for the year leading up to each presidential election in the sample.
3 Data
My data consist of the voting histories of individual FOMC members from 1973 through
1994 and the FOMC￿ s internal forecasts for real GNP growth and in￿ ation.8 The data
represent the nineteen potential voting members at each FOMC meeting: the twelve regional
Federal Reserve Bank presidents and the seven Board governors.9 On average there are ten
meetings per year at which twelve voting members choose to raise, lower, or maintain the
prevailing federal-funds rate in open-market operations. Members￿votes are recorded as
two dichotomous variables: a loosening vote equals 1 if the member votes to loosen and 0
otherwise: a tightening vote equals 1 if the member votes to tighten and 0 otherwise.
Over the sample period four individuals served as chairman: Arthur Burns from 1970
through 1977; C. William Miller from January 1978 through mid-1979; Paul Volcker from
June 1979 through July 1987, and Alan Greenspan from July 1987 to the present. Table 1
reports the exact dates of each chairman￿ s term and the dates of presidential elections in the
8The data also contain real-GDP-growth forecasts, but for a much shorter time period, and employment
forecasts, which give very similar results when substituted for real-GNP-growth forecasts in the estimation.
9I thank Geo⁄ Tootell of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston for graciously making the data available
to me. The seven board governors (including the chairman) and the president of the New York Fed vote at
each meeting. The other four voting slots rotate between the presidents of the other eleven regional banks.
6Table 1: Terms of Recent FOMC Chairmen and the Dates of Presidential Elections
Chair Dates of Tenure Presidential Elections
Arthur Burns February 1970 to January 1978 November 1972 & 1976
C. William Miller January 1978 to June 1979
Paul Volcker June 1979 to July 1987 November 1980 & 1984
Alan Greenspan July 1987 to present November 1988 & 1992
sample. There are ￿ve elections in the post-1972 sample.10
3.1 Forecasts
The FOMC￿ s internal forecast, known as ￿ the Green Book￿ , is circulated before each FOMC
meeting. It contains the Board sta⁄￿ s projections of the time path of such macroeconomic
variables as in￿ ation, real GNP growth, and unemployment for one to four quarters in the
future. As a historical document, the Green Book is a record in real time of the Board sta⁄￿ s
expectations of the future course of domestic economic variables. FOMC members receive
the latest Green Book forecast several days before each FOMC meeting and the Board￿ s
sta⁄ of economists also presents the key points at the FOMC meeting.
Using the Green Book forecasts as a benchmark against which to measure the votes of the
FOMC lets us determine whether voting behavior di⁄ers in periods preceding an election
relative to other periods for given values of the internal forecasts. Green Book forecasts
are not a mechanical extrapolation from a simple macroeconomic model; they draw on a
10The time period I can consider is limited by availability of the Green Book forecasts.
7wide array of information, both quantitative and qualitative, and they include a detailed
projection of the future path of ￿scal policy. Although the Green Book forecasts do not
necessarily replicate each committee member￿ s expectations with respect to future economic
activity, they are the best existing proxy for members￿information set. Several authors have
used the Green Book forecasts to proxy for the collective expectations of FOMC members,
notably Tootell (1991, 1996) and Chappell and McGregor (2000).
My use of the Green Book forecasts as a benchmark for monetary policy builds on the
political-business-cycle literature in several ways. First, a forecast made in real time is
a better proxy for the information available to FOMC members than is a forecast based
on ex-post data.11 A real-time forecast captures aspects of the committee￿ s expectations
that are conditional on the information available to them and possibly di¢ cult to capture
later. A sophisticated forecast should also be a better proxy for the committee￿ s collective
expectations than a mechanical extrapolation from a simple macroeconomic model, which
some previous studies use.12 The Green Book forecasts incorporate a sophisticated model
of expected future changes in ￿scal policy that a mechanical extrapolation cannot hope to
capture.13
11Stark and Croushore (2002) describe the shortcomings of forecasts based on ￿ the ￿nal, revised data,
rather than the data that were available to economic agents who were making forecasts in real time￿(p. 1).
12For example, Chappell et al (1993) proxy for committee members￿expectations with the ￿ predicted
values from a rolling regression of equations explaining each of the target variables from 1960 to 1987￿(p.
193).
13Even among sophisticated forecasts, the Green Book forecasts are quite good. Recent empirical work
￿nds that Green Book forecasts capture the time path of key macroeconomic variables more accurately than
do private forecasts. Romer and Romer (2000) ￿nd that Green Book in￿ ation forecasts were more accurate
than private in￿ ation forecasts from 1965 through 1991. They ￿nd somewhat weaker evidence that the Green
Book output forecasts were more accurate than private output forecasts over the same period. Similarly,
Gavin and Mandal (2001) ￿nd that private-sector blue-chip consensus forecasts stand in well for the Green
Book￿ s forecasts for output growth, but not for in￿ ation over the 1965-to-1995 period. To the extent that
FOMC members have had anecdotal evidence of the superior performance of the Green Book relative to
private-sector forecasts, they were likely to view its predictions as more accurate than than outside forecasts.
8Table 2: Summary Statistics from the Green Book
Mean Median Standard Min Max
Deviation
Real-GNP-Growth Forecast 2.3 2.6 2.7 -6.1 8.5
In￿ ation Forecast 5.6 5.1 2.0 2.7 11.5
Votes to Tighten .22 0 .41 0 1
Votes to Loosen .15 0 .36 0 1
Table 2 summarizes the Green Book data. The forecast variables generally appear to have
reasonable magnitudes. I use the two-quarter-ahead forecast, considered more accurate than
longer-term forecasts and more relevant than shorter-term forecasts that fail to capture the
long lags with which monetary policy a⁄ects the economy. The real-GNP-growth forecast has
a mean of 2.3 percent with a standard deviation of 2.7 percent, while the in￿ ation forecast
has a mean of 5.6 with a standard deviation of 2 percent. For the committee as a whole,
22 percent of votes tighten monetary policy, 15 percent loosen monetary policy, and the
remaining 63 percent make no change in policy.
4 Econometric Model
This section describes the econometric procedures used the estimate the model￿ s parameters.
4.1 Probit Model
I identify the model as a probit model, using a simple probit speci￿cation to analyze the
committee￿ s voting behavior. This means the committee￿ s choice probabilities are derived
9under the assumption that the error term "t from equation (1) is distributed normal with a
mean vector of zero and covariance matrix ￿. That is, idiosyncratic factors that may a⁄ect
the committee￿ s voting probabilities but that are not directly observable by the econome-
trician are assumed to be normally distributed: " = ("1;:::;"T) ￿ ￿(0;￿)where ￿(￿) is the
cumulative normal distribution. The probability that the committee on vote t chooses to
tighten (or, in the second estimation, to loosen) policy is given by F(xt￿ +￿￿t +￿zt +"t) =




ln[1 ￿ ￿(xt￿ + ￿￿t + ￿zt + "t)] +
X
yt=1
ln￿(xt￿ + ￿￿t + ￿zt + "t)
Because the Fed moves gradually, one might expect to observe some serial correlation
in the error term, even after controlling for the information available to FOMC members
before each vote. To address this issue, I obtain the Newey-West estimate of the covariance
matrix of the parameters which is e¢ cient in the presence of heteroscedastic and ￿rst-order
autocorrelated residuals.
I use a pooled estimator to analyze the panel data with the individual FOMC members￿
votes. Likelihood-ratio tests for panel-level variability indicate that estimation using a pooled
estimator ￿that is, a simple probit ￿is e¢ cient.14 A question that arises with the panel
14The estimates of the Wald test statistic for the joint null hypothesis of identical intercept coe¢ cients
across voting members of 30.68 and 26.68, for the tightening and loosening regressions respectively, do not
exceed the 99% critical value of 33.41 for the chi-square cumulative distribution function with 17 degrees
of freedom. Wald tests do not reject the joint null hypotheses of identical slope coe¢ cients across FOMC
members on each of the forecast variables either. For the loosening regression, the estimates for the Wald
test statistics of 9.23 and 23.57, for the real-GNP-growth and in￿ ation forecasts respectively, do not exceed
the ￿2 (17) 95% critical value of 27.59. For the tightening regression, the estimates of the Wald test statistics
of 18.61 and 24.07, for the real-GNP-growth and in￿ ation forecasts respectively, do not exceed the ￿2 (17)
95% critical value of 27.59. Wald tests of the election dummies do not reject the null hypothesis of identical
member coe¢ cients in any of the regressions.
10data is whether individual FOMC members vote independently of the chairman. To address
this issue, I correct the standard errors for clustering of the observations at each vote, thus
allowing for correlation across members￿behavior at an individual vote.
Why consider the votes of individual FOMC members at all? While the chairman clearly
exerts in￿ uence over other FOMC members, the frequency of dissenting votes indicates
that they retain some independence. It is thus of interest to consider the determinants of
individual members￿votes, as well as those of the chairman, to see if they di⁄er, particularly
in the period before an election.
5 Results
Table 3 presents the marginal e⁄ects of the forecast variables and the election dummy on
committee votes. Each column corresponds to a separate probit regression in which I regress
an FOMC voting dummy on the two-quarter-ahead forecasts of real GNP growth and in￿ a-
tion and on an election dummy. The coe¢ cients represent the partial e⁄ect of the variable
xj on the probability of a vote to tighten (or to loosen) ￿that is, the estimated marginal
change in the probability of a vote for the continuous variables (the forecasts of in￿ ation
and real GNP growth) and the estimated discrete change in the probability of a vote for the
dummy variable (the election dummy). Because the probit model is a nonlinear model, each
regressor￿ s partial e⁄ect depends on the values of all the regressors x. The sample averages
of the regressors are used to calculate the marginal e⁄ects reported in Table 3.
The coe¢ cients are generally signi￿cant and signed as one would expect for the behavioral
model of FOMC members presented above. As in￿ ation or real-GNP-growth forecasts rise,
11the probability rises that the committee will vote to tighten policy. At the mean values of
the forecast variables, a 1-percent rise in the in￿ ation forecast makes the committee about
3.5 percent more likely to vote to tighten policy, and a 1-percent rise in the real-GNP-
growth forecast makes the committee about 2.2 percent more likely to vote to tighten policy.
Similarly, a small rise in the in￿ ation or real-GNP-growth forecast diminishes the probability
that the committee will vote to loosen policy. At the mean values of the forecast variables,
a 1-percent rise in the in￿ ation forecast makes the committee 3.4 percent less likely to vote
to loosen policy, and a 1-percent rise in the real-GNP-growth forecast makes the committee
almost 5 percent less likely to vote to loosen policy.
These marginal e⁄ects can vary considerably as each regressor becomes very small or
very large. As the in￿ ation forecast rises from its minimum value of 2.7 to its maximum
value of 11.5, it contributes 28 percent to the voting probability when the real-GNP-growth
forecast is at its median value, and 35 percent when it is at its maximum value. Similarly,
as the real-GNP-growth forecast rises from its minimum value of -6.1 to its maximum value
of 8.5 it contributes 22 percent to the voting probability when the in￿ ation forecast is at its
median value and 36 percent when it is at its maximum value.
Votes to tighten policy exhibit an electoral cycle that is statistically signi￿cant. Com-
mittee members are 12.3 percent less likely to vote to tighten policy in the year preceding
an election than at other times for given values of their internal forecasts. That is, the
discrete e⁄ect of the election dummy switching from 0 to 1 reduces the probability of a vote
to tighten by 12.3 percent in the year before an election when the two forecast variables are
at their mean values. The election dummy￿ s coe¢ cient is signi￿cant at the p<10-percent
12level. When both forecast variables are at their maximum values, the discrete e⁄ect of the
year-ahead election dummy is -18.6 percent on the probability of a vote to tighten. When
both forecast variables are at their minimum values, the discrete e⁄ect of the year-ahead
election dummy is -9.2 percent.
Votes to loosen policy do not exhibit an electoral cycle that is statistically signi￿cant.
Column (2) of Table 3 reports that the marginal-e⁄ects coe¢ cient on the electoral-cycle
dummy in the loosening estimation is positively signed for the year preceding the election,
at 4.2 percent but is not signi￿cant.
Table 4 reports results from estimation of the voting model for individual committee
members. The marginal e⁄ects of each of the variables on members￿voting probabilities
appear roughly equal to their e⁄ects on the committee as a whole. The increase in statistical
power from the larger sample size is re￿ ected in the fact that all three variables are now
signi￿cant at the p<1-percent level for votes to tighten.15 Committee members are 13.7
percent less likely to vote to tighten policy in the year before a presidential election than at
other times for given values of the Green Book forecasts. That is, the votes of individual
FOMC members exhibit a dead spot before presidential elections.16
While suggestive, these results may be an artifact of macroeconomic variables left un-
controlled that could a⁄ect voting behavior, such as ￿scal policy or oil-price shocks. As
15The sample size for the committee as a whole is 203 observations, while that for the individual committee
members is 2319 observations.
16The committee￿ s voting behavior may di⁄er in the period following an election as well. If the committee
is less likely to vote to tighten policy in the period preceding an election than at other times, then it may
be more likely to vote to tighten policy following the election. The voting model indicates that committee
members are 4.7 percent more likely to tighten policy in the year following an election than at other times
for given values of their internal forecasts. This result is not robust to the addition of other ￿scal-policy
variables to the regression, however.
13the Green Book forecasts control for important trends in other macroeconomic variables,
adding additional macroeconomic variables to the model should a⁄ect the coe¢ cients on the
forecast variables due to collinearity, but not the election dummy￿ s coe¢ cients. To test the
robustness of the results of interest in Tables 3 and 4, I re-estimate the model for votes to
tighten with variables that should a⁄ect voting behavior if they are not already controlled for
in the forecasts. The results support the contention that the Fed￿ s sta⁄incorporates a range
of macroeconomic shocks into their forecasts of in￿ ation and real-GNP growth. Columns
(1) and (3) of Table 5 report results with an oil-price-shock dummy and columns (2) and
(4) report results with the only measure of ￿scal policy that clearly exhibits an electoral
cycle over the sample period, the federal government￿ s net transfers to individuals relative
to GNP.17
These additional variables do not a⁄ect the signi￿cance (or the sign) of the election
dummy in any of the regressions reported in Table 5. The oil-price-shock variable is not
signi￿cant in either of the regressions reported in columns (1) and (3). Including the oil-
price-shock dummy causes the standard error on the in￿ ation forecast to rise slightly in both
the committee and the panel data. The ￿scal-policy variable has little e⁄ect on any of the
variables￿coe¢ cients or signi￿cance. It is negatively signed at -.047 and signi￿cant at the
5-percent level for the panel data. As net transfers to individuals rise as a share of GNP, the
committee is less likely to vote to tighten. However, it is still less likely to vote to tighten in
the year before an election than at other times, for given values of its internal forecasts.
A ￿nal robustness check considers the econometric implications of a possible feedback
17Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) ￿nd evidence of an electoral cycle in this variable in the 1961-1994
period.
14e⁄ect from FOMC votes to the Green Book forecast. That is, the regressors may be weakly
exogenous. Dealing with weakly exogenous regressors is not trivial given the nonlinear
structure of the model. One can test for weak exogeneity of the regressors using a procedure
developed by Smith and Blundell (1986).18 Using the Smith-Blundell procedure, I am able
to reject the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity for both the in￿ ation forecast and the
real-GNP-growth forecast. The appendix reports these results with an explanation of the
Smith-Blundell procedure.
The main empirical ￿nding is consistent with Drazen￿ s AFPM political-business-cycle
model. The results also support the empirical ￿ndings of Beck (1987) who argued that the
Fed accommodated an electoral cycle in ￿scal spending over the 1961-to-1984 period.
5.1 Discussion
What institutional practice generates this passive electoral cycle in monetary policy? As
others have speculated, the FOMC may be less willing to act to tighten policy preceding a
presidential election to avoid accusations of meddling in the political process. As Beck notes,
FOMC members may regard it as improper for the Fed to counter an electoral cycle in ￿scal
policy created by elected o¢ cials. Alternatively, FOMC members may be averse to the type
of ￿ne-tuning policy that would be necessary to compensate for the electoral cycle in net
transfers. Finally, the timing of the chairman￿ s appointment to four-year terms may leave
the FOMC vulnerable to presidential political pressure. Starting with the appointment of
18Smith and Blundell substitute residuals ￿ from a ￿rst-stage regression of a potentially endogenous
variable x on suitable instruments (for example, its own lagged value) into a structural nonlinear function.
This procedure yields a simple test for weak exogeneity of the regressors.
15Paul Volcker by President Carter in 1979, FOMC chairmen have been appointed to terms
that conclude in the period preceding a presidential election. A sitting chairman could
conceivably seek to help an incumbent by exploiting the short-term Phillips-curve trade-o⁄
in the period before his possible reappointment.
6 Conclusion
The large theoretical literature on political business cycles dates back to the 1970s. The
theory has not previously been tested using FOMC votes, in part because there was little
information available about the determinants of such votes. By estimating a model of FOMC
voting functions using new data that have become available only in the past few years, this
paper provides a more direct test of an electoral cycle in monetary instruments than previous
studies￿tests on those instruments￿intermediate targets, such as monetary aggregates or
interest rates. The model shows that FOMC members are less likely to vote to tighten
monetary policy in the year preceding a presidential election than in other years for given
values of their internal forecasts. These results build on the work of Drazen (2001) and Beck
(1987) arguing that the Fed accommodated an active electoral cycle in ￿scal policy in the
post-1972 period.
16Table 3: FOMC Votes Exhibit a Dead Spot Before Presidential Elections, 1973-19941;2
Vote Tighten Loosen
Before the Election 1 year 1 year














Pseudo R2 :04 :13
Log Likelihood ￿102:03 ￿74:43
1Each column presents the results of a probit regression in which the dependent variable is a voting
dummy. The tables report the estimated marginal change in the probability for the continuous variables
(the forecasts of in￿ ation and real GNP growth) and the estimated discrete change for the dummy variable
(the electoral-cycle dummy).
2The sample size in all regressions is 203 observations. The absolute values of Z-statistics are reported in
parentheses and are calculated using Newey-West robust standard errors which are corrected for ￿rst-order
autocorrelation. Those starred are signi￿cant at the *10-percent or **5-percent level.
17Table 4: FOMC Members￿Votes Exhibit a Dead Spot Before Elections, 1973-19941;2
Vote Tighten Loosen
Before the Election 1 year 1 year














Pseudo R2 :04 :11
Log Likelihood ￿1212:34 ￿887:79
1Each column presents the results of a probit regression in which the dependent variable is a voting
dummy. The tables report the estimated marginal change in the probability for the continuous variables
(the forecasts of in￿ ation and real GNP growth) and the estimated discrete change for the dummy variable
(the electoral-cycle dummy).
2The sample size in all regressions is 2319 observations. The absolute values of Z-statistics are reported in
parentheses and are calculated using Newey-West robust standard errors which are corrected for ￿rst-order
autocorrelation and for clustering of the observations at each vote. Those starred are signi￿cant at the
*5-percent or **1-percent level.
18Table 5: Robustness Checks on Votes to Tighten Before Elections, 1973-19941;2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before the Election 1 year 1 year 1 year 1 year

























Oil-Price-Shock Dummy ￿:013 :031
(:12) (:73)
Fiscal Policy ￿:040 ￿:047
(1:00) (3:09)
￿￿
Pseudo R2 :04 :04 :04 :05
Log Likelihood ￿102:03 ￿101:52 ￿1211:97 ￿1204:79
Observations 203 203 2319 2319
1Each column presents the results of a probit regression in which the dependent variable is a voting
dummy. The tables report the estimated marginal change in the probability for the continuous variables
(the forecasts of in￿ ation and real GNP growth and the ￿scal-policy variable) and the estimated discrete
change for the dummy variable (the electoral-cycle dummy). The ￿scal-policy variable is federal transfers to
individuals net of contributions to social insurance relative to GNP. Data are annual and detrended. Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. The oil-price-shock dummy is 1 in the periods
of rapid increases in oil prices, that is, the last three months of 1973 and the years of 1974, 1979, and 1980.
2The absolute values of Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using Newey-West
robust standard errors which are corrected for ￿rst-order autocorrelation for both samples and for clustering
of observations at votes for the panel data. Those starred are signi￿cant at the *10-percent or **5-percent
level.
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23A Smith-Blundell Test
This appendix describes the Smith-Blundell (1986) procedure to test for weak exogeneity of
the regressors. The Smith-Blundell estimator is computed in a two-step procedure in which
one model is embedded in another:
Model 1: E fy1jx;￿1g
Model 2: E fy2jw;v;￿2;E (y1jx;￿1)g
where ￿1 is a q ￿ 1 vector of parameters associated with the n ￿ q matrix of variables
X = fx1;...xqg; ￿2 is a p ￿ 1 vector of parameters associated with the n ￿ p ￿ 1 matrix of
variables W = fw1;...wpg; v is an n ￿ 1 regressor estimated in the ￿rst stage and used in
the second stage, that is, the Smith-Blundell (hereafter, SB) estimator, and ￿ = fW;vg is
an n ￿ p matrix of variables. SB (1986) show that one can substitute the residuals from a
￿rst-stage regression of a potentially weakly exogenous variable x on its lagged value into a
structural nonlinear function. The procedure yields a simple test for weak exogeneity of the
regressors, that is, the t-test signi￿cance on the residuals in the second-estimation, as well
as identi￿cation of nonlinear structural parameters in the case of weak exogeneity. Table
6 reports the SB weak-exogeneity tests for the in￿ ation and real-output-growth forecast
variables. I am able to reject the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity for both the in￿ ation
and the real-output-growth forecasts.
24The Variance-Covariance Matrix for the SB Estimator
In the two-step procedure, one estimates the parameters of the ￿rst model ￿1; and then
the parameters of the second model ￿2 conditional on the results of the initial estimation by










The variance estimator for the second-stage model must re￿ ect the fact that one of the




: Let $1 specify the marginal log-likelihood
function for the ￿rst-stage model, a normal linear regression model, and $2j1 the conditional
log-likelihood function for the second-stage model, a probit model. The log-likelihood func-
tion for the ￿rst-stage model is $1 =
Pn
i=1 ln(￿(xi￿1)) where ￿ is the normal density and




y2i=1 ln(1 ￿ ￿(￿i￿2)) where ￿ is
the cumulative normal distribution. The adjusted variance matrix V2a for the second-stage
model is given by:





















































































where ￿2vi is the estimated coe¢ cient on the generated regressor b v in the second stage
and V1 is computed using the robust sandwich variance estimator with ui = y1i ￿ b y1i:
26Table 6: Smith-Blundell Test for Weak Exogeneity of Forecast Variables, 1973-19941;2
Vote Tighten Loosen














In￿ ation BS Residual :066 ￿:008
(1:56) (:21)
GNP BS Residual :003 ￿:042
(:13) (1:58)






Pseudo R2 :05 :04 :13 :15
Log Likelihood ￿101:17 ￿102:03 ￿74:41 ￿72:55
18Each column gives the marginal e⁄ects coe¢ cients from a probit regression where the dependent variable
is a voting dummy. The tables report the estimated marginal change in the probability for the continuous
variables (the forecasts of in￿ ation and real GNP growth and the residual variable) and the estimated discrete
change for the dummy variable (the electoral-cycle dummy).
18The sample size in all regressions is 203 observations. The absolute values of Z-statistics are reported in
parentheses and are calculated using Newey-West robust standard errors which are corrected for ￿rst-order
autocorrelation. Those starred are signi￿cant at the *10-percent or **5-percent level.
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